The Saga of the Scorpion, Part I: The Patuxent's Lost Flotilla

Today's post is the first of two concerning the wreck of the U.S.S. Scorpion and the Chesapeake Flotilla in the Patuxent River near Upper Marlboro, Maryland. Thanks to Heather Brown of the Naval History & Heritage Command's Underwater Archaeology Branch for this article! 

On August 21, 1814, a flotilla of American gunboats under the command of Joshua Barney was scuttled in the Patuxent River near Upper Marlboro, Maryland, to prevent capture by the British. To anyone familiar with this area, the natural question is how a passel of cannon-laden Navy vessels managed to reach this shallow, winding, marsh-clogged section of river. A likely follow-up question is: Why were they there at all?

Detail of an 1840 nautical chart showing the stretch of Patuxent River between Pig Point and Queen Anne, where the flotilla was destroyed.

The story of Joshua Barney’s flotilla begins in the summer of 1813. The Royal Navy blockade of the Chesapeake was well underway, cutting off trade out of the rich farmlands of Virginia and Maryland, as well as preventing American forces from Norfolk, Washington, and Baltimore from effectively engaging the British.  In addition to intercepting merchant shipping, the British sent troops ashore to conduct brief raids, destroying strategic buildings, burning crops, and making off with goods.  The U.S Navy had few vessels in the region and those were no match for the world-renowned Royal Navy at the height of its power, honed to a well-oiled machine by its decades-long conflicts with France.

During the presidency of Thomas Jefferson (1801-1809), the country’s policy was to limit naval development, focusing on coastal defenses rather than sea-going vessels, in order to preserve American neutrality abroad. Therefore, the government invested heavily in gunboats, relatively small vessels, usually between 45 and 65 feet long, that could be rowed or sailed, with a shallow draft for use in coastal waters, and armed with from one to four guns.  Nearly two hundred of these ships were built prior to the outbreak of the war by different shipwrights in different cities, using a variety of plans. The result was a somewhat motley collection of vessels consisting of galleys, cutters, sloops and schooners.

February 1813, as the blockade commenced, found the bulk of U.S. Naval resources in the Chesapeake  bottled up by the British in the Elizabeth River at Norfolk. This left at large 3 gunboats (Nos. 70, 71, and 137), the schooner Asp and frigate Adams still being fitted out in Washington; the cutter Scorpion (former gunboat No. 59) on its way north from Norfolk; and 1 gunboat (No. 138) at Baltimore.  In April, Secretary of the Navy William Jones authorized the lease of four armed schooners (Patapsco, Comet, Revenge and Wasp) from among the privateers of Baltimore for the defense of that city.  These resources proved insufficient in preventing the growing depredations of the British.

Baltimore was the center of shipping in Maryland and the home base for a fleet of bold privateers that had had a profitable season preying upon British shipping the previous summer. Among these was Joshua Barney, who had served with distinction in the Continental Navy and served as a Commodore with French navy from 1796 to 1802.  A man of action, he could not sit placidly by while the British raided the Chesapeake coastline.  On July 4, 1813 he wrote a letter to the Secretary of the Navy outlining a plan to defend the Bay by building a squadron made up of “a Kind of Barge or Row-galley, so constructed, as to draw a small draft of water, to carry Oars, light sails, and One heavy long gun.”  He believed 20 such vessels would be enough and proposed that Jones “form them into a flying Squadron, have them continually watching & annoying the enemy in our water, where we have the advantage of shoals & flats” and man them with merchant sailors from Baltimore, many of whom were available as the blockade strangled the normal volume of shipping in the port.

With few other options to hand, Secretary Jones formally agreed to the plan on August 20th, and placed Barney in command of the whole endeavor, a force designated the Chesapeake Flotilla, answerable directly to Jones and separate from the regular navy.  His command would “consist of the Barges, now building by contract at Baltimore for this Department, such of the City Barges, as may be purchased, or taken into the service of the U. States and such other Barges, Gun Boats, or vessels as may, from time to time, be attached thereto, by order of this Department.”

The naval constructor at Washington, William Doughty, had indeed been hard at work developing plans for several classes of barges and begun construction both at Washington and Baltimore.  Initially, contracts were let for eight vessels for the flotilla, with such Baltimore shipbuilders as William Parsons (24 July 1813), Thomas Hall and Benjamin White (23 July 1813), and William Flannigan (24 July 1813).  In December another 10 of the smaller barges were to be built by Perry Spencer of St. Michaels, a town renowned for its shipbuilding, and that had in fact been attacked unsuccessfully by the British back in August in hopes of destroying its shipyards.

This excerpt from a contract between Navy Agent James Beatty and Baltimore shipbuilders Thomas Hall and William White lays down the price of $2000 for one “Row Galley.”

The barges were described by Jones in a letter to Commodore Thomas McDonough at Lake Champlain as follows:

“The first Class, 75 feet long and 15 wide, to carry a long 24 and a 42 pound Carronade, row 40 oars, and drawing but 22 inches water, with all on board.

“Second class, 50 feet long and 12 feet wide, to carry a long 18 and 32 pd. Carronade, and row 26 oars; they have been tried, and are the most perfect of their kind.”

Copies of Doughty’s plans survive, though the liberties taken by the shipbuilders to amend the vessels and subsequent repairs can only be truly documented archaeologically, such as has been done by Eric Emery for Allen, a Lake Champlain vessel also built on Doughty’s plans.

William Doughty’s plan for a first-class barge or row galley demonstrates the very shallow draft of these vessels.  

Barney’s flotilla was augmented by two Jeffersonian-era gunboats (Nos. 137 and 138), a small row galley, the schooner Asp, and Scorpion, which served as the flagship.  The two gunboats were not not as light and maneuverable as the barges and caused Barney much difficulty under his command.  He described them as “too heavy to Row, and too clumsy to sail, and are only fit to lay moor’d, to protect a pass, or Assist a Fort.”

These small vessels, from an engraving of McDonough’s Victory on Lake Champlain, may resemble Barney’s barges, as they were built from the same plans, designed by William Doughty.  

We know comparatively little about Scorpion.  It began life as Gunboat No. 59, built ca. 1806 by George Hope of Hampton, Virginia.   In 1812, it was rebuilt at the Washington Navy Yard, and rechristened Scorpion.  Based on its description as a cutter or a sloop, it was likely a single-masted, fore-and-aft rigged vessel.  One witness reports it had six gunports per side, though an 1814 inventory indicates it was carrying only 5 guns.  Given how vociferously Barney complained about the failings of his flotilla vessels, his silence on the subject of Scorpion suggests it performed to his satisfaction.

A preliminary cruise took place in mid-April of 1814, disproving Jones’s statement that the barges were perfect, at least those of the second class, which took on much water and, in three cases, sustained damage to their rudder heads. Barney attempted to lighten their load by swapping out the 18 pounders for 12 pounders, and reducing the amount of provisions they carried, but they still were susceptible to high seas.  He further reduced their load by relocating all shot but 15 rounds per vessel to the larger barges. This still did not stop the problem and he finally had 8-inch high washboards installed, for, he reported, “the men are very unwilling to remain on them in their present state.” There were still problems with space, as there was not adequate room aboard for the sick or wounded, the two gunboats were crammed full and prone to leakage, and the smaller barges had to remain as light as possible. In early June, Barney was able to strike a deal with William O’Neale and Robert Taylor of Georgetown for use of their schooner Islet as a supply ship.

By the end of May, with the most serious problems ironed out and concerned by reports of British activity at Tangier Island, Barney headed toward the Potomac with thirteen barges, the two gunboats, a row galley, a lookout boat, and Scorpion.  On the June 1st they encountered Royal Navy schooner St. Lawrence and its various boats.  The flotilla gave chase, but Captain Barrie of St. Lawrence summoned aid from the nearby 74-gun HMS Dragon, putting Barney on the defensive.  A sudden squall from the southwest cut off Barney’s approach to the Potomac, and he ordered a retreat to the Patuxent, with the British in pursuit.  Shots were exchanged off Cedar Point, but Dragon was unable to stem the tide, and Barrie did not want to risk St. Lawrence and its small boats against the full force of the flotilla.

Thus the flotilla found itself hemmed in the Patuxent, where it would remain until its ultimate destruction in August.  As the summer progressed, the British gradually brought in ships with shallower draft, and were able to pursue them further up the river.  Finally, as the British landed troops on shore, it became clear that Barney’s men would be needed on land to help defend Washington, and he was ordered to destroy the flotilla rather than leave it behind for the enemy to capture.  Thus, somewhere above Pig Point, near Upper Marlboro, a skeleton crew set fire to the ships, which, according to British testimony, were subsequently “in quick Succession blown to atoms.”  Islet too was scuttled by its captain, and several merchant vessels harboring with the flotilla were captured and burned by the British.

The remains of all of these vessels settled into the riverbed.  The guns were salvaged later in the year, along with other important equipment and ballast.  In the years following the war, as population increased and agriculture intensified, the upper reaches of the Patuxent River began to silt in.  The area where once these lengthy vessels traveled is now limited to small fishing boats and canoes.  At least one wreck associated with the flotilla has been located, buried under approximately three feet of sediment and beautifully preserved in its oxygen-free environment.  No doubt there are others that await discovery.  A detailed study of these wrecks could answer many lingering questions about how these ships were designed, how they handled, and what life aboard was like for the intrepid Maryland sailors who manned them.

The Patuxent River north of Pig Point is now very narrow and shallow, accessible mainly to small motor boats and canoes

Samuel Smith of Baltimore

Sorry for the long hiatus! Summer is a busy time for archaeologists and it's sometimes hard to keep up with blogging and fieldwork at the same time. But never fear, we have several weeks of interesting history, archaeology, and other stuff coming your way. Today: getting to know Samuel Smith, hero of two wars and exceptional Marylander.

Portrait of Samuel Smith by Rembrandt Peale

The people who stepped up to fight the British during the War of 1812 were, sometimes, the same people who had already done so once before. Their names may not be widely celebrated for their service during the Revolution - after all, George Washington was basically the Michael Jordan of Revolutions, and his star power was pretty intense. No offense to GW, I'm sure he didn't mean to, but he tends to overshadow a lot of his contemporaries. Happily, he had several young officers who possessed a flinty brand of military resourcefulness that came in really handy when the British invaded Maryland again in 1814.

One of these rugged veterans was Samuel Smith, and man, this guy was a seriously tough customer.

On September 23, 1777, at the tender age of 24, Lieutenant Colonel Samuel Smith of Maryland was given his marching orders by General Washington. Washington told Smith to take command of Fort Mifflin, between Mud and Hog Islands, on the Delaware River below Philadelphia.

"The keeping of this fort is of very great importance, and I rely on your prudence, spirit and bravery for a vigorous and persevering defense,'' Washington explained.

Forts Mifflin and Mercer, both located along the Delaware River, were of huge importance to Washington's plan to starve the British army out of newly captured Philadelphia. It’s a bit of a long story, but suffice it to say that although Smith did not ultimately succeed in defending the fort, it wasn’t for lack of trying. Even when it became apparent that the fight was lost, Smith stubbornly refused to abandon the fort. He was struck by a cannonball and grievously injured, and he STILL didn’t give up. Five days after Smith was hit with the cannonball, the fort was set on fire and finally, Smith was forcibly evacuated to New Jersey. This was a guy who understood the meaning of “a vigorous and persevering defense.”

In 1779, Smith resigned and went home to Baltimore to make a fortune as a privateer and take part in politics, but his civilian service was short-lived. In the War of 1812, he took charge of the defenses of Baltimore. The British once again fired cannons at him, and Smith was, once again, totally unfazed by that nonsense.

As we’ve discussed on this blog before, British forces landed in Maryland, routed the Americans at the Battle of Bladensburg on August 24, 1814, and burned Washington, D.C. The British command then decided to advance on Baltimore. Smith immediately began preparations, mobilized the militia of Baltimore, and ordered additional fortifications built. By early September, Smith had 15,000 men under his command.

The British, led by Major General Robert Ross (until his death; more on this in a later post), landed on North Point on September 12, 1814 with 4,000 soldiers and encountered a delaying force led by Brigadier General John Stricker. It would have been nice if they had been a decisively victorious force, but delaying was enough. Stricker retreated to Hampstead Hill, a fortified position east of Baltimore, where Smith had stationed thousands of militiamen. Smith foiled British attempts to execute a flanking maneuver, and then positioned his troops so that a British frontal assault would be exposed to crossfire. The British retreated on September 14th.

The British were simultaneously attempting a naval assault. Admiral Cochrane bombarded Fort McHenry throughout the day on September 13th (you’ve probably heard about this before), but McHenry and its covering forts (Covington and Babcock) resisted ably. The following day, Cochrane rejoined the troop transports holding the unsuccessful British army and left for the West Indies.

You can visit Samuel Smith’s statue today in Federal Hill. This monument was dedicated on July 4, 1918 and was created by sculptor Hans Schuler. From 1918 to 1953 the statue was located in Wyman Park at Charles and 29th Streets. It was moved in 1953 to Pratt Street and Light Street, and finally moved again in 1970 to its current location.

Do not mess with General Sam Smith

Smith is also remembered on the city’s Battle Monument, located on North Calvert Street between East Fayette and East Lexington Streets.

So, after he finished defending Baltimore, and America, from the British, Sam Smith retired to his country home, Montebello, where he pottered around and dabbled in beekeeping for the rest of his days.

Just kidding. Smith liked to stay busy. According to the Biographical Directory of the United States Congress, this is a rundown of his activities before, during, and after the War of 1812:

 attended a private academy; engaged in mercantile pursuits; served in the Revolutionary War as captain, major, and lieutenant colonel; engaged in the shipping business; member, State house of delegates 1790-1792; at the time of the threatened war with France in 1794 was appointed brigadier general of militia and commanded Maryland’s quota during the Whisky Rebellion; during the War of 1812 served as major general of militia in the defense of Baltimore; elected to the Third and to the four succeeding Congresses (March 4, 1793-March 3, 1803); did not seek renomination in 1802, having become a candidate for Senator; chairman, Committee on Commerce and Manufactures (Fifth through Seventh Congresses); elected as a Democratic Republican to the United States Senate in 1802; reelected in 1808 and served from March 4, 1803, to March 3, 1815; served as President pro tempore of the Senate during the Ninth and Tenth Congresses; elected to the Fourteenth Congress to fill the vacancy caused by the resignation of Nicholas R. Moore; reelected to the Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Congresses and served from January 31, 1816, to December 17, 1822, when he resigned, having been elected Senator; chairman, Committee on Expenditures in the Department of the Treasury (Fourteenth Congress), Committee on Ways and Means (Fifteenth through Seventeenth Congresses); elected in 1822 as a Democratic Republican (later Crawford Republican and Jacksonian) to the United States Senate to fill the vacancy caused by the death of William Pinkney; reelected in 1826 and served from December 17, 1822, to March 3, 1833; served as President pro tempore of the Senate during the Twentieth and Twenty-first Congresses; chairman, Committee on Finance (Eighteenth through Twenty-second Congresses); mayor of Baltimore, Md., 1835-1838; retired from public life; died in Baltimore, April 22, 1839; interment in the Old Westminster Burying Ground.

Even this fairly exhaustive summary of Smith's exploits fails to do him justice. What they don't mention here is Smith organized yet another militia effort in 1835, to help stop the Baltimore Bank Riots. He was 83 years old at the time, and he still did not put up with nonsense. He marched out of his house and took over as Mayor before the entire city government could succumb to an angry mob. After all, how can a simple mob intimidate you when you've been hit with a cannonball and survived?  

Samuel Smith always strikes me as someone who ought to be better known, and more appreciated, than he is. So, spread the word and maybe Samuel Smith's legacy will one day equal his contributions to the country in general and the State of Maryland in particular. 

BEFORE YOU GO: We invite your contributions and questions! Know anyone who's doing 1812-ish archaeology? Let them know that we'd love to have a post about their work. 

Rediscovering the Curtis Creek Iron Furnace

Today's post is brought to us by Dr. John Kille. John is the Assistant Director of Anne Arundel County's Lost Towns Project where he has worked as an historical archaeologist for 15 years. With a background in history, he earned advanced degrees from the University of Maryland and the George Washington University specializing in Material Culture, Cultural Landscape Studies, and Museum Studies. He also recently curated "Discover London Town!," an award-winning permanent museum exhibit at Historic London Town and Gardens.

Hope you all enjoy learning about the Curtis Creek Iron Furnace!

Rediscovering Anne Arundel County’s Curtis Creek Iron Furnace

As coordinated efforts to commemorate Maryland’s involvement in the War of 1812 proceed across our state, archaeologists with Anne Arundel County’s Lost Towns Project have partnered with the Maryland State Highway Administration to assess, document, and preserve the Curtis Creek Iron Furnace (c. 1759) in Glen Burnie. This investigation is being directed by Julie Schablitsky and complements a laudable effort spearheaded by the Ann Arrundell Historical Society* to preserve portions of the site prior to the construction of Route 10 nearly a half century ago.

The Curtis Creek Iron Furnace once stood on the southern shore of Furnace Creek, where over the course of almost a century it smelted local iron ore and charcoal into pig iron.  This manufacturing operation was among a growing number of enterprises that arose after the Maryland General Assembly passed an act in 1719 to provide various economic incentives to encourage iron manufacture.  The furnace and a later foundry also reportedly produced large castings such as cannons, cannon balls, and shot that equipped American forces against British invasion.

The site chosen for the furnace was advantageous for several reasons.  The location ensured access to local iron ore deposits, wood from surrounding forests necessary for the production of charcoal in kilns, a constant source of water power from a one-mile mill race fed by nearby Saw Mill Creek, and water transportation for exporting iron production.

Abandoned Curtis Creek Iron Furnace, circa 1911

This type of furnace was of a blast design, constructed of stone and brick and 30 feet tall.  A water wheel positioned next to the furnace powered a mechanized bellows which pumped blasts of air through pipes to achieve an intense heat during the smelting process.  A ramp leading up to the rear of the furnace would have been used to feed iron ore and charcoal into an opening located toward the top of the structure.  The furnace and several associated operations were positioned alongside high drop offs, to which water was channeled from a one-mile long mill race supplied by nearby Saw Mill Creek.  The entire mill race was reportedly still visible on the landscape prior to the construction of Route 10.

The furnace had several owners, including the Dorsey, Ridgely, and Barker families.  It also operated in conjunction with different furnaces in the region, including the Elkridge Furnace, situated along the Patapsco River, and the Northhampton Furnace in Towson.  Ads placed in the Maryland Gazette document that African Americans worked at the furnace.  In 1760, Caleb Dorsey advertised for the return of “Jem, a country-born Negro, 27 years old, who ran away from Curtis Creek Works.”   In 1817, another ad placed in the same newspaper described “the runaway Negroes Jack Boyer and Will Nevil…who ran away from Mr. Charles B. Ridgely Jr.’s farm… both bought of Mr. John E. Dorsey, in Feb. last at the Aetna Furnace, formerly the Curtis Creek Furnace…” 

During the War of 1812 John E. Dorsey entered into a contract with the United States Ordnance Department to provide both ammunition and gun carriages.  An order placed in 1813 called for “300 Tons of heavy Shot 18 & 24 Pdrs deliverable at Baltimore @ 72 $, 10 Tons Grape Shot @ 120.”  Also, “60 Gun Carriages (travelling) with Timbers complete 40 for 6 pdrs: at 215 $ a piece, 20 for 24 pdrs at 245 $ a piece.”   A first hand account of Miss Sarah A. Randle, 96 years of age, recorded in 1890, describes the involvement of the Curtis Creek Furnace during the War.  According to Ms. Randle, “At the beginning of the war of 1812 Captain Abner Linthicum’s company of the county militia, of which her father was a member, was called out, and was often in service, for longer or shorter periods, as required, which it lasted, sometimes at Fort Madison, opposite Annapolis, sometimes at Etna Furnace, Curtis Creek, where cannon were cast before and during the war.  The uniform of this company was gray, with dark blue facings.” 

It is against this broad historical backdrop that Lost Towns Project archaeologists Shawn Sharpe, John Kille, Anastasia Poulos, and Stephanie Sperling, and volunteers Skip Booth, Jim Morrison, and Barry Gay assessed the integrity of this multi-faceted industrial site.  This team was directed by Dr. Al Luckenbach, Anne Arundel County Archaeologist, C. Jane Cox, Anne Arundel County Cultural Resources Planner, and the author.  This work was extremely challenging due to a formidable overgrowth of trees and brush, many decades of trash dumping and looting, dredged soil spread over much of the site during the construction of nearby Route 10, and mounds of slag debris.  Despite these obstacles, much progress has been made to document the physical layout of the furnace complex, including a number of later buildings and wharves in close proximity to the water.

Total station transit used by Maryland State Highway Administration Survey Team and Lost Towns Project archaeologists at Curtis Creek Site.

Precise mapping tools such as Lidar and Total Station, helped to identify areas where the natural landscape had been altered.  Lidar mapping is an optical remote sensing technology that measures distances and properties of targets by illuminating the target with laser light and analyzing the backscattered light.  The Total Station transit uses laser light to create accurate maps that delineate topography and the relative location of landmarks and site features.  Maps created with these advanced tools proved very useful in exploring and recording landmarks and physical features.

Map of Curtis Creek Site created with Lidar and Total Station mapping technology.  Lidar map shows gradations delineating elevations and human disturbances upon the natural landscape, with an overlay of landmarks discovered by Lost Towns Project archaeologists that were precisely recorded with a laser transit by MSHA surveyors.

The first landmark identified by the Lost Towns Project was the spot where the Curtis Creek Iron Furnace once stood.  The furnace complex was found to be situated upon a high, flat area overlooking Furnace Creek, free of dredged fill and trash and perhaps the most well-preserved area of the site.  Large stones and brick used in the construction of the furnace were documented on the surface of this high area and the slope leading down to Furnace Creek below.  Heavy concentrations of slag were also spread over much of this general area as well.  

It was not possible to determine the type of operations that stood alongside the drop offs west of the furnace, as they were covered with dredge fill.  Perhaps the biggest surprise of this field survey was the recent discovery of extensive foundations for a later industrial complex and wharf landing situated east of the furnace site, along the shoreline.  The existence of early stone foundations, as well as cinder block and concrete construction, suggests a long period of occupation.  However, much more focused research and analysis will be necessary before the story of this built environment can be told.

This project has provided an outstanding opportunity to examine both the rich history and the intriguing cultural landscape of the Curtis Creek Iron Furnace.  Representing one of the earliest industries in Anne Arundel County, this venerable works also deserves recognition for its involvement in War of 1812.  A more detailed report of this investigation is found in the Spring 2013 edition of the Anne Arundel County History Notes, published by the Ann Arrundell County Historical Society.

[1] Maryland Gazette, February 14, 1760.

[1] Ibid., August 7, 1760.

[1] National Archives, Record Group No. 156, Contracts, Vol. 1, Entry 78, pp. 5 and 6.  1812-1829, 7W2, 223-241.

[1] Baltimore Sun, September 16, 1890.

*Yes, it really is spelled like that. 

Native Allies: The Battle of Credit Island Part V

Welcome to the final post in a series about the forgotten (but now, clearly, remembered) Battle of Credit Island! Today our guide, Chris Espenshade, addresses another significant piece in the puzzle of that 1814 battle: the Native American warriors who fought with the British. Who were they, and what might they know about what happened that day? You can read Parts I-IV in this series by clicking on the links below.

Part I
Part II
Part III
Part IV

WHICH NATIVE ALLIES?  

One might think that it would be relatively straightforward to identify the tribal affiliations of the 800-1200 Native American warriors who participated in the Battle of Credit Island. That would seem like too many participants to be ignored or misidentified in the contemporary accounts. However, most of what we know comes from British and American accounts, and the sources were not always specific or accurate in ascribing fighters to specific tribes.

Chief Black Hawk of the Sauk (from History of the Indian tribes of North America, with Biographical Sketches and Anecdotes of the Principal Chiefs). 

It is clear that warriors from the nearby Fox and Sauk villages participated, including Chief Black Hawk.  It is also clear that a group of Sioux was assigned to protect the British artillery.  Unfortunately, “Sioux” was a generalized term that was interchangeably applied to diverse groups throughout the region.  One account mentions the participation of Kickapoos and Puant. We do not know if there were other tribal participants beyond the Sioux, Sauk, Fox, Kickapoos, and Puant.

History is always enriched by a variety of perspectives, so information requests were sent to the Flandreau Santee Sioux; Ho-Chunk Nation; Iowa Tribe of Kansas & Nebraska; Iowa Tribe of Oklahoma; Lower Sioux; Mendota Mdewakanton Dakota Community; Otoe-Missouria Tribe; Prairie Island Indian Community; Sac & Fox of the Mississippi in Iowa; Sac & Fox Nation of Missouri; Sac & Fox Nation of Oklahoma; Santee Sioux Tribe of Nebraska; Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community; Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate; Spirit Lake Tribe, North Dakota; Upper Sioux Indian Community of Minnesota; and Winnebago Tribe of Nebraska.  

In the hope that some oral tradition of the battle may have survived, I asked if there was any tribal oral history or archival record that the tribe had participated at the Battle of Credit Island. Once the British lost the war, it was probably not a good thing for a tribe to broadcast their participation on the British side at the Battle of Credit Island. 

The responses are just starting to come in, and we have not yet added any tribes beyond the Sauk, Fox, and Sioux. The letter also serves the purpose of inviting Native American input into how the battle is interpreted and commemorated.  The City of Davenport strongly desires to publicly interpret the battle, and 2014 will likely see a major bicentennial celebration.  

From the existing accounts, we have been able to determine that Native Americans at the Battle of Credit Island scouted far downstream and kept the British informed of the progress of the American boats. They encouraged and assisted the movement of the artillery on the morning of September 5. The Native American warriors prevented the Americans from landing a party to flank the British gun position. Given the important role of the Native American forces in this battle, we are hopeful that descendants will provide input into how they would like the battle remembered.  

And with that, we have come a complete circle back around to the first post, identifying Credit Island as a forgotten battle. With the data from our recent efforts, the City and the ABPP will be able to begin a process of public outreach and interpretation.  Our initial proposals include signage along the existing bicycle paths, and a self-guided canoe/kayak tour of the battlefield.  If you find yourself anywhere near Davenport, Iowa in September of 2014, we encourage you to visit the battlefield and see the steps the City and the ABPP have made in bringing the battle back to life. 

This research – conducted by Commonwealth Cultural Resources Group -- was sponsored by the American Battlefield Preservation Program and the City of Davenport, Iowa.  This material is based upon work assisted by a grant from the Department of the Interior, National Park Service. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Interior.

Understanding Military Terrain: The Battle of Credit Island Part IV

Once again, we return to Credit Island with our guide, Chris Espenshade, who is going to walk us through a KOCOA analysis of the 1814 battle. Parts I-III can be found by clicking the links below.

Part I
Part II
Part III

MILITARY TERRAIN: WHAT MAKES SENSE?

As noted in the earlier posts, the study of the Credit Island Battlefield was hindered by weaknesses in two areas, archaeological data and collector information. The nature of the battle actions, the natural forces of the Mississippi River and its flooding, and modern intrusions onto key battle locations together meant little evidence of the battle survived.  There were not any productive areas for avocational metal detectorists, and the archaeological survey likewise came up empty.  In the previous blog (Part III), we discussed how the various battle accounts were reconciled.  It is now time to look at the military terrain.

 Glossary of Terms Used in KOCOA Analysis (from McMasters 2009).

Term	Definition
Key Terrain	Any local feature that dominates the immediate surrounding by relief or another quality that enhances attack of defense
Decisive (or Critical) Terrain	Ground that must be controlled in order to successfully accomplish the mission
Observation	The ability to see friendly and enemy forces and key aspects of the terrain to allow management of the conflict
Field of Fire	An area that weapons may effectively fire upon from a given position
Dead Space	An area within the maximum range of a weapon or an observer, but which cannot be seen or fired upon from a given position
Cover	Protection from enemy fire
Concealment	Protection from enemy observation
Obstacles	Natural or man-made terrain features that prevent, impede, or divert military movement
Avenue of Approach	Relatively unobstructed ground route that leads to an objective or key terrain
Avenue of Withdrawal	Relatively unobstructed ground route that leads away from an objective or key terrain
Mobility Corridor	Area or location where movement is channeled due to terrain constrictions

One of the key issues in the KOCOA analysis was the position of the American boats.  Earlier studies assumed that the boats were on the western side of Pelican Island, because the British had a clear line of sight from the Iowa bank of the river.  However, as we examined the accounts, two items called this conclusion into question. Both items appear in the accounts of clearing the Native Americans from Pelican Island.

Zachary Taylor reported driving the troops across the island, emerging on the Iowa side, implying an east-to-west movement.  The Americans would not have been moving toward the own boats, and that would have created the risk of friendly fire incidents. Taylor further reported that the American left was close enough the Credit Island to fire on the Native Americans wading to Credit Island from Pelican Island.  For the American left to have been on the south, the Americans had to be moving east-to-west.

When the American boats are repositioned to the northeast shore of Pelican Island, a number of KOCOA outcomes are derived.  In the War of 1812, artillery depended on line of sight, and shots were not made through or over vegetated landforms. This fact, combined with the reported distance of approximately 600 yards from the artillery to the boats, and with the report that the British could see the boats broadside, led to a secure best guess of the British artillery. Once this position was determined, it was possible to address other issues such as where the dead space began as the Americans retreated downstream.

KOCOA Analysis figure showing field of fire (yellow) and dead space (red) from the likely British artillery position (produced in Google Earth 2013).

The archival data for this battle are strong, and the landscape allowed us to place great confidence in our KOCOA analysis. Although it would have been great to have collector information or archaeological data, by using multiple means of data collection and analysis, we have crafted a well-supported battle analysis.

But wait, there's still a missing piece to this puzzle! More on that in the fifth and final post!

This research – conducted by Commonwealth Cultural Resources Group -- was sponsored by the American Battlefield Preservation Program and the City of Davenport, Iowa.  This material is based upon work assisted by a grant from the Department of the Interior, National Park Service. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Interior.

Reporting a Snowball Fight: The Battle of Credit Island Part III

Hello all, and welcome to the third installment of Chris Espenshade's series about the investigation of the Battle of Credit Island! You can find Part 1 here, and Part 2 here. Chris explains not only the history of this almost-forgotten battle, but also how archaeologists help reconstruct and interpret battle events. Enjoy!

Reporting a Snowball Fight: Biases in Military Reporting of Battle Actions

As you may recall from my previous post, one of the data sources for revising battle narratives is the archival record.  At first blush, some readers might think that the archival record should be given primacy, as, after all, these are the first-person accounts of the actual participants.

In order to attempt to explain to a 5th Grade class the many biases affecting such accounts, I introduced the analogy of a snowball fight.  How accurately could the student describe a snowball fight between just two combatants, in a small side yard of the school, lasting only five minutes, and limited to three snowballs for each?  That seemed a fairly reasonable task.

From that starting point, I then began elaborating, to get closer to a military situation.  The forces were increased to hundreds or thousands.  The landscape was one with which the participants were unfamiliar.  The snow balls were actually replaced by artillery and small arms, and the battlefield was enshrouded in trees, fog, and gun smoke.  The observers would not be allowed to prepare their reports until a week or two after the battle.  The reputation and career advancement of the observer might be affected by what he reported.   The battle would be one of dozens fought in the past few weeks, and the observer is likely sleep-deprived, poorly nourished, and possibly wounded.  I asked the fifth graders what they thought would happen to the truth as all these factors were added into the mix.  How could you possibly know what really happened?

So, it is not surprising to find wildly divergent accounts by the various participants of a battle. One of our key tasks in the Credit Island battlefield study was to reconcile the various accounts. This requires considering how a given participant gained knowledge, and what motives they may have had to mis-report the situation.  It should be noted that it is unusual for a single source to be the most reliable on all major issues of a battle, and the narrative has to be taken apart and addressed issue by issue.

Below you will see a table for the issue of the count and size of British artillery.  You might expect fairly consistent data on this very basic information, especially given the importance of this artillery to the outcome of the battle.  Instead, you see that the number and/or size of the British guns was consistently over-stated by the Americans (artillery are characterized by the weight of the round ball they fire, so a 3-pounder shoots a projectile that weighs about 3 pounds, and that measures about 2.75 inches in diameter).

Source	Data	Comments
Black Hawk (Native American)	“our big gun”	Black Hawk is focused on the largest piece, but is not necessarily intent on offering a full inventory.  Eye-witness.
Zachary Taylor (American)	“a six, a four, and two swivels”	Taylor had a strong incentive to exaggerate the strength of the British guns.  The Americans actually had greater artillery power present at the battle, but failed to bring their 6-pounder into action.
J. Callaway (American)	(letter) “one six one four and one three Pounders”	Callaway did not closely observe the guns.  He had incentive to exaggerate the strength of the British.
J. Shaw (American)	Two 12-pounders, plus logs disguised as additional artillery	This seems complete fiction on part of Shaw
Reynolds (American)	“six pieces of cannon”	Account written well after the battle.
D. Graham (British)	“three-pounder and two swivels”  He identifies artillerists, Sgt. Keating (3-pounder), Lt. Brisbois (swivel), and Colin Campbell (other swivel)	Directly observed the weaponry and their deployment.  His gun list is consistent with what he was ordered to bring to the battle.
T. Anderson (British)	In his order of August 29, he states “one brass three-pounder, and two swivels” After action: 3-pounder (Keating), Lt. Brisbois (swivel), Colin Campbell (other swivel)	Orders are highly reliable unless counter-manded.  Not the case here. The after-action is based directly on Graham’s account.
Meese (1915)	Three-pounder and two swivels	Accepts Graham/Anderson accounts.
Mahon (1972)	Three small cannon	Generalizes from Graham, Anderson, or Meese.
Ferguson (2012)	Three-pounder and two swivels	Accepts Graham/Anderson accounts.
George Eaton (personal communication 2013)	3-pounder and 2 swivels	Accepts Graham/Anderson accounts.

Example of a British 3-pounder (from the Web-page of John Lamb’s Artillery Company)  The reconciliation of various accounts led to the conclusion that the British at Credit Isalnd has one 3-pounder and two swivel guns (probably 1-pounders).

Variety of Swivel Guns (from Henry and Delf 2004:Plate C).

It is not possible to know if certain of the observers purposefully lied, or if they simply did not have good information.  

Only after reconciling the accounts issue by issue was I able to define key data for the KOCOA analysis and the revised battle narrative. To return to the 5th graders, I now know which accounts of the snow ball fight are most reliable on each issue.  At this juncture, it is time to take the class outside, and see how the information jives with the military terrain of the battlefield.

This research – conducted by Commonwealth Cultural Resources Group -- was sponsored by the American Battlefield Preservation Program and the City of Davenport, Iowa.  This material is based upon work assisted by a grant from the Department of the Interior, National Park Service. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Interior.

The Forgotten Battle: Credit Island, Part II

Hi and Welcome Back for the second installment about this little-known War of 1812 battle! You can find the first part here.

Ever wondered how archaeologists reconstruct the blow-by-blow details of battles that occurred in the distant past? Just keep reading - Chris Espenshade will explain it all to you. And stay tuned, because this series will continue next week! Thanks for reading.

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Interpreting the Landscapes of Battle: Typical Approaches to ABPP Grant Projects

Each War of 1812 battlefield has its own characteristics and challenges. To create a battle narrative that guides preservation and interpretation, there are generally four major data sources:

KOCOA/Military Terrain Analysis
Archival Data
Archaeological Results
Collector Data

In a perfect world, all four classes of data would be abundant. The Archival Data includes after-battle reports, diaries, letter, and maps. Such information must be used carefully, as it is well-demonstrated that various biases can affect the accuracy of the Archival Data (more on this in Post 3).

The KOCOA/Military Terrain Analysis requires the analyst to study the landscape from the perspective of the soldier, applying inherent military logic. KOCOA looks at key terrain, decisive terrain, observation, field of fire, dead space, cover, concealment, obstacles, avenue of approach, avenue of withdrawal, and mobility corridor. By applying Inherent Military Logic and defining these key features of battlefields, the researcher is able to match the battle narrative to the landscape.  For certain battles, the landscape and military behavior provide a strong input for the revised battle narrative.

Archaeological data, as seen in a number of projects on this web-page, can provide firm information on where actions occurred on the landscape. The plotting of fired and dropped bullets, fired artillery rounds, and dropped equipage can often allow for the definition of battle lines and positions. When a battlefield has reasonably good integrity, the archaeology becomes very important in creating or supporting a revised battle narrative. For most battlefield situations, controlled metal detector survey is the best method for recovering spatial data.

Metal Detecting in Progress, near head of Credit Island.  Many twentieth century items were recovered, but no battle-related material.  

Lastly, many American battlefields have been examined for decades by avocational detectorists.  These folks generally come armed with a strong interest in local history and a metal detector.  Such collectors can often provide valuable data on artifact distributions, and many have fairly sophisticated interpretations of their favorite battlefields.

Unfortunately for the Credit Island project, the local avocational metal detectorists did not have any information on any battle artifacts. In addition, despite our eight days of archaeological  metal detecting in the high probability areas of the battlefield, no battle-related artifacts were recovered. This was due to the nature of the battle, the natural impacts of Mississippi River flooding, and the modern development in many of the best locations. These negative findings shifted the emphasis of the study to the archival data and the KOCOA/military terrain analysis.  As is so often the case in battlefield studies, you work with what you have.

Area of Suspected British Artillery, Facing North-northeast.  Unfortunately for the archaeologists, approximately three feet of modern fill dirt have been deposited here.  On the positive side, the bike path can provide public access to interpretive signage.

This research – conducted by Commonwealth Cultural Resources Group -- was sponsored by the American Battlefield Preservation Program and the City of Davenport, Iowa.  This material is based upon work assisted by a grant from the Department of the Interior, National Park Service. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this material are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of the Interior.